Abstract: John Rawls shares the Enlightenment's commitment to finding moral and political principles which can be reflectively endorsed by all individuals autonomously. He usually presents reflective autonomy in Kantian, rationalist terms: autonomy is identified with the exercise of reason, and principles of justice must be constructed which are acceptable to all on the basis of reason alone. Yet David Hume, Adam Smith and many other Enlightenment thinkers rejected such rationalism, searching instead for principles which can be endorsed by all on the basis of all the faculties of the human psyche, emotion and imagination included. The influence of these sentimentalists on Rawls is clearest in his descriptive moral psychology, but I argue that it is also present in Rawls's understanding of the sources of normativity. Although this debt is obscured by Rawls's explicit "Kantianism," his theory would be strengthened by a greater understanding of its debts to the sentimentalist Enlightenment.
enriched by the fact that it stands between the rationalist and sentimentalist Enlightenments, drawing philosophical resources from both. Despite Rawls's own insistence to the contrary, his work owes as much to Hume and Smith as it does to Kant.
In order to clarify Rawls's debt to the sentimentalist as well as the rationalist Enlightenment, it is helpful to understand their competing theories of moral and political reflection as combining two separate elements. To use Hume's most famous distinction, they both offer a theory of what "is" and a theory of what "ought to be"-a descriptive moral
psychology that explains what goes on when we engage in moral and political reflection and a theory of normativity which explains why the standards we reach through such reflection must be treated as authoritative. While sentimentalism describes reflection as a matter of feeling and imagination as well as cognition, rationalism describes reflection as a matter of rational cognition alone. While sentimentalism understands normativity as stemming from the reflective stability of a mind able to bear its own holistic survey, rationalism sees normativity as authoritative legislation by the faculty of reason-here identified with our true, free self. After these two areas of disagreement are further explicated in the remainder of this introduction, the essay will then proceed by examining Rawls's position on each of these areas of disagreement in turn. The second section of this essay will discuss the relationship between sentimentalism's description of our moral psychology and Rawls's description; the final section will then discuss the relationship between the sentimentalist theory of normativity and the theory (or, as we will see, theories) of normativity that Rawls provides. Although Rawls implicitly endorses much of sentimentalism's description of our moral psychology, he explicitly rejects the sentimentalist theory of normativity which might naturally accompany this descriptive psychology. Yet Rawls's own approach to normative theorizing is far more compatible with the sentimentalist tradition than Rawls himself is willing to admit.
Two Theories of Reflective Autonomy
Although both the rationalist and sentimentalist Enlightenments are united in their endorsement of reflective autonomy, 5 they have different notions of what it means to legislate moral and political standards for oneself. They are divided on the nature of the self who is doing the legislating and the nature of the self who is obeying the standards so legislated. To use a Platonic locution, they disagree about which regime is proper within the individual soul. The rationalist theory of reflection separates the legislative faculties of the reflective mindidentified as "reason"-from the faculties that obey. The sentimentalist theory, on the other hand, sees the standards created in ethical reflection as products of the mind as a whole, and does not distinguish sovereign and subject aspects of the mind.
Admittedly, this reading of sentimentalism as a kind of democratic egalitarianism of the soul is in sharp contrast to the standard interpretation of Enlightenment sentimentalism. David Hume in particular is conventionally read as advocating a psychic regime as fully hierarchical as that of his rationalist opponents-disagreeing with them only as to which faculties are to be sovereign and which are to be subject. While rationalists from Plato onward maintained that reason is rightly the master and passion rightly the slave, Hume famously counters that "reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions." 6 But this memorable bit of rhetoric distorts
Hume's true view. Although philosophers may rightly distinguish the operations of reason from those of passion, Hume consistently maintains that the two are actually "uncompounded and inseparable." 7 It is true that Hume believes reason alone powerless to motivate action; it is in this 6 sense which reason is and ought to be passion's slave. Yet the sentiments which Hume describes as motivating moral action are not merely passions, but products of the mind as a whole, reason and imagination included. It is from passion alone that they get their motivational impetus, but moral sentiments are much more than mere impetus. So the contrast between rationalism and sentimentalism is best understood as the contrast between a hierarchical view of the moral soul on the one hand, and an egalitarian view on the other-an egalitarian view in which normatively authoritative standards are the product of an entire mind in harmony with itself.
Despite their hierarchical view of the proper psychic regime, Enlightenment-era rationalists considered their theory to be one of reflective autonomy because they identified themselves with the sovereign, legislative faculty and not with the subject faculties that obey its Just as the passions take a subordinate place in the rationalist psychic regime, the study of these non-rational forces takes a subordinate place in rationalist moral and political theory. For rationalists, empirical anthropology is always subsidiary to the a priori metaphysics of morals.
Only after reason has finished determining what standards we ought to follow can we then address the empirical question of how social and psychological contingencies may be better brought in line with reason's authoritative demands.
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Sentimentalism, by contrast, adopts a different attitude toward contingency, and identifies the true self with the whole self, contingent social and psychological elements included.
Sentimentalist theorizing thus begins where rationalist theorizing ends-namely, with the empirical examination of what actually motivates us to follow our current standards and practices. Such motivations can be seen, the sentimentalists argue, to stem from moral sentiments-emotionally-charged products of our psychological makeup and social context as well as our rational cognition. The faculty of sympathy is central to their descriptive etiology of these moral sentiments. Sympathy is the bridge between the social and the psychological; it is the faculty by which inner mental states are shared among individuals. So the empirical socialpsychology of reflection offered by sentimentalism can be understood largely in terms of the reflective expansion and correction of our sympathetic bonds to our fellow human beings.
Rawls's relationship to this richly descriptive social-psychological tradition of will be the subject of the next section of this essay.
Yet the sentimentalist account of reflection is not merely descriptive. The sentimentalists know that we not only approve and disapprove of our individual actions and our shared political practices, but also of our own sentiments of approval and disapproval. The fact that we can have higher-order moral sentiments-that we can approve or disapprove of our own approval and disapproval-allows for a process of reflection in which the mind as a whole repeatedly turns on itself as a whole, and winnows out those sentiments which cannot pass the test of reflection.
Such psychologically holistic reflection leads us through a gradual progress of moral sentiments, as more and more of our contingently-given convictions are revised or rejected outright. Only those moral sentiments which endure when we reach reflective equilibrium can be treated as authoritative, for only minds in reflective equilibrium are capable, as Hume puts it, of "bearing their own survey." 12 Rawls's conflicted position on this theory of normativity as psychologically holistic reflective stability will be the subject of the final section of this essay.
Caring About Justice: Sentimentalism's Descriptive Moral Psychology

The Feminist Revival of Descriptive Sentimentalism
By the final decades of the twentieth century, academic moral and political thought was in the midst of a neo-Kantian moment. There has long been an association between sentimentalism and femininity. "The age-old split between thinking and feeling" Gilligan writes, "underlies many of the clichés and stereotypes concerning the difference between the sexes." Yet these stereotypes, Gilligan famously argues, point to "two modes of judging, two different constructions of the moral domain" (DV, p. 69)-a masculine mode based on abstract rules of justice or fairness, and a feminine mode based on care or sympathy for concrete individuals.
Feminist advocates of an "ethics of care" have frequently noted the affinity between their distinctive moral "voice" and that of the Enlightenment sentimentalists. 17 Annette Baier goes so far as to argue for a tradition of male moral philosophers who "should be given the status of honorary women," of whom Hume, despite his occasional pre-feminist moments of misogyny, is the greatest exemplar. 18 In keeping with Baier's analysis, Gilligan identifies the different voices of her study as "characterized not by gender but theme." Their association with gender, she admits, "is an empirical observation" (DV, p. 2)-an observation we now have very good empirical grounds for doubting. 19 Yet regardless of whether there is anything truly gendered about the rejection of moral rationalism, feminist ethicists are in large part responsible for launching the contemporary reclamation of Enlightenment sentimentalism, particularly in the field of empirical moral psychology.
Okin's Sentimentalist Interpretation of the Original Position
Given Gilligan's characterization of the rationalist moral voice as advocating an ethics of justice or fairness, it might be thought that Rawls's theory of "justice as fairness" would provide a paradigmatic example of such anti-sentimentalism. 20 Hume and Smith are indeed presented in a largely negative light throughout A Theory of Justice, albeit not insofar as they were
sentimentalists, but only insofar as they are alleged to have been the intellectual ancestors of the utilitarian position against which Rawls frames his rival theory of justice. 21 The antisentimentalist interpretation of Rawls's descriptive moral psychology, however, has been convincingly refuted by Susan Moller Okin. "Whereas Rawls's theory is sometimes viewed as excessively rationalistic, individualistic, and abstracted from real human beings," she writes, "at its center (though frequently obscured by Rawls himself) is a voice of responsibility, care and concern for others." 22 Okin admits that Rawls's Kantian intellectual heritage-with its "stress on autonomy and rationality as the defining characteristics of moral subjects," not to mention its "rigid separation of reason from feeling and refusal to allow feeling any place in the formulation of moral principles"-led Rawls to formulate his theory "in the language of rational choice" (RF, p. 231).
Nonetheless, like all "the best theorizing about justice," Rawls's philosophy "has integral to it the notions of care and empathy, of thinking of the interests and well-being of others who may be very different from ourselves." 23 Caring about doing justice to our fellows, after all, involves caring about them, not merely insofar as they embody some abstract value of "dignity" or "humanity," but also insofar as they are concrete individuals and objects of our sympathetic sentiments. In opposition to many of her fellow feminists, Okin thus "questions the wisdom of distinguishing between an ethic of care and an ethic of justice" (RF, p. 247). Indeed, Enlightenment sentimentalists never oppose justice and care, or fairness and sympathy, as does Gilligan. Like Okin, they instead maintain that our natural, emotional ties to each other play an integral role in our reflective commitment to justice.
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The hidden influence of the sentimentalist Enlightenment on Rawls's descriptive moral psychology is largely obscured by the contractarian thought experiment from which this theory is built, that of the original position. 25 Rawls asks us to imagine ourselves to be single-minded seekers of self-interest, creatures radically unlike the human beings that Hume and Smith describe, but not unlike the homo economicus of the rational-choice tradition. 26 Rawls describes the lack of "extensive ties of natural sentiment" on the part of the imagined actors of the original position as a special virtue of his thought experiment, one which allows him to draw on only premises which are "widely shared and yet weak. At the basis of the theory," he writes, "one tries to assume as little as possible" (TJ, pp. 111-112). To the weak assumption of mutual disinterest, however, Rawls adds a much stronger assumption: that in a fair deliberation over the principles of justice parties would be denied virtually all knowledge about themselves-from their race, sex and socioeconomic status to their religion and "conception of the good." Given that a "veil of ignorance" makes knowledge of one's particular identity impossible, in formulating principles of justice Rawls's imagined self-interested actors are forced "to take the good of others into account." A combination of mutual disinterest and selective ignorance can thus achieve "much the same purpose as benevolence" (TJ, pp. 128-129).
As Okin observes, moreover, this requirement of taking the good of others into account means that actors behind the veil of ignorance must differ from the homo economicus described by rational-choice theory in another important respect: such actors cannot rely on instrumental reason alone for purposes of the relevant deliberations, but also must possess the emotional and imaginative capacity of well-developed empathy, something akin to what the English-language sentimentalists of the eighteenth century called "sympathy." 27 Okin writes:
To think as a person in the original position is not to be a disembodied nobody. This, as critics have rightly pointed out, would be impossible. Rather, it is to think from the point of view of everybody, or every "concrete other" whom one might turn out to be… To do [so] requires, at the very least, both strong empathy and preparedness to listen carefully to the very different points of view of others (RF, pp. 245-248).
Consider Should we, who are not behind the veil of ignorance, nonetheless choose to commit ourselves to the principles of justice which would be chosen by the imaginary, egoistic actors behind it, he realizes that our "desires and aims are surely not egoistic" (TJ, p. 128). For us, who know who we are and where our individual interests lie, to treat the perspective of the original position as authoritative-refraining from exploiting our obvious socioeconomic and political advantageswe need not only great empathy into the lives of those very different from ourselves, but also, as
Okin writes, "a great commitment to benevolence; to caring about each and every other" (RF, p. 246). Under Okin's interpretation-and despite Rawls's own association of sympathy with the utilitarian position against which his own theory is framed-Rawls thus joins Hume and Smith in maintaining that "the capacity for enlarged sympathies" is "clearly required for the practice of justice" (RF, p. 237).
Rawls's Implicitly Sentimentalist Description of Moral Development
If Characteristically, Rawls himself insists that his picture of moral development is derived from a tradition of "rationalist thought" which stretches from Rousseau and Kant to Piaget and Kohlberg. Rawls gives a very odd reading of this "rationalist" tradition, however, arguing that it views "the moral feelings as a natural outgrowth of a full appreciation of our social nature." He summarizes its position thus:
We have a natural sympathy with other persons and an innate susceptibility to the pleasures of fellow feeling and self-mastery, and these provide the affective basis for the moral sentiments once we have a clear grasp of our relations to our associates from an appropriately general perspective… It is painful for us when our feelings are not in unison with those of our fellows; and this tendency to sociality provides in due course a firm basis for the moral sentiments…. (TJ, p. 403).
Although Rawls may follow Kohlberg in describing a movement from preconventional morality (what Rawls calls "the morality of authority") to conventional morality ("the morality of association") and to postconventional morality ("the morality of principles"), here moving from one stage to another involves an increased ability to see the world from the perspectives of others, combined with a growing sense of fellow-feeling which motivates one to make regular use of this ability (see TJ, pp. 410-411). Moral development builds from the care we first feel for friends and family; "wanting to be fair with our friends and wanting to give justice to those we care for is as much a part of these affections as the desire to be with them and feel sad at their loss." A sense of justice evolves as we extend this concern to all of society, perhaps all of humanity, and can be spurred by the development of emotional ties beyond our small sphere of intimates. "Thus in a well-ordered society where affective bonds are extensive both to persons and to social forms," Rawls writes, "there are strong grounds for preserving one's sense of justice" (TJ, pp. 499-500).
Even when Rawls describes "the morality of principles" which is the final stage in his scheme of moral development, the rationalist elements of his theory are combined with a strong sentimentalist strain. Although Rawls argues that a fully developed "sense of justice" must come to involve a commitment to acting justly for its own sake-and hence must "display an independence from the accidental circumstances of our world"-he also maintains that a commitment to justice for its own sake grows naturally out of concern for one's associates, and is continuous with our "natural sentiments" (TJ, p. 416). 29 Since Rawls sees the morality of principle as a matter of reflectively endorsed moral sentiments inseparable from the experience of certain human emotions, his account of moral development actually owes at least as much to
Hume and Smith as it does to Kant.
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Bearing our Own Survey: The Sentimentalist Theory of Normativity
Rawls on Hume's Theory of Normativity as Reflective Stability
No account of the development of our moral psychology could ever, by itself, justify our moral commitments; to believe otherwise is to confuse an empirical explanation of the origins of a value commitment with a demonstration of its genuine normative authority. 31 Yet once we accept a sufficiently sentimentalist description of our moral psychology-one which sees our moral commitments as reflective outgrowths of basic human emotions-a possible method for normatively justifying these commitments immediately suggests itself. Rawls recognizes this as worry that we will come to "doubt the soundness of our moral attitudes when we reflect on their psychological origins" (TJ, p. 451). Christine Korsgaard, for example, expresses concern that certain psychological theories may adequately explain, from a third-person perspective, why individuals act morally while making it impossible for agents to justify such action from their own, first-person perspective unless "kept in the dark about the source of their own moral motivation." 33 If true, such a descriptive psychological theory would make the reflectivelyinformed normative justification of our moral commitments impossible, for, as Korsgaard writes, "to raise the normative question is to ask whether our more unreflective moral beliefs and motives can withstand the test of reflection." The fear of such theories is, she argues, why "we seek a philosophical foundation for ethics in the first place: because we are afraid that the true explanation of why we have moral beliefs and motives might not be one that sustains them." 34 If Hume's (or, for that matter, Rawls's) description of our moral psychology is correct, however, a complete understanding of the origins of our proper moral commitments can only help us "gain the peace and inward satisfaction of being able to bear our own survey."
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Although such a defense of human morality cannot convince a committed Kantian, who is determined to find a morality binding on any rational being as such, the Humean can simply reply, with Rawls, that "beings with a different psychology either have never existed, or must soon have disappeared in the course of evolution" (TJ, p. 433).
Although Rawls is clearly aware of the possibility of such a normative vindication of his sense of justice, he nonetheless rejects it explicitly. "The fact that one who lacks a sense of justice… lacks certain fundamental attitudes and capacities," he writes, "is not to be taken as a reason for acting as justice dictates" (TJ, p. 428). Rather than being presented as a possible normative justification of his theory, the discussion of moral development in Chapter VIII of A Theory of Justice is meant merely to counter one possible objection to justice as fairness:
namely, that it might prove unstable over time. "One conception of justice is more stable than another," Rawls writes, "if the sense of justice that it tends to generate is stronger and more likely to override disruptive inclinations." In order to achieve such stability, it is thus critical that "when institutions are just (as defined by this conception), those taking part in these arrangements acquire the corresponding sense of justice and desire to do their part in maintaining them… However attractive a conception of justice might be on other grounds," Rawls concludes, "it is seriously defective if the principles of moral psychology are such that it fails to engender in human beings the requisite desire to act upon it" (TJ, p. 398).
His description of moral development, however, makes it clear that Rawls's own conception of justice is not liable to this criticism; it shows "how justice as fairness generates its own support and… that it is likely to have greater stability than the traditional alternatives" (TJ, p. 399). This description of our moral psychology, however, is explicitly not intended as part of the reflective justification for Rawls's conception. "The main grounds for the principles of justice have already been presented," Rawls claims. "At this point we are simply checking whether the conception already adopted is a feasible one and not so unstable that some other choice might be better" (TJ, p. 441). This conception of empirical psychology's subsidiary place in moral and political theory is, as has already been discussed, characteristic of Enlightenment rationalism. Only after reason has finished the justificatory work of normative reflection do rationalists then examine how the rest of the human psyche can be made to conform to reason's authoritative demands.
Sentimentalist and Rationalist Sources of Normativity in A Theory of Justice
In the 1971 presentation of justice as fairness in A Theory of Justice, Rawls's own approach to the question of normative justification is highly ambiguous. On the one hand, Rawls puts forward a broad notion of reflective equilibrium fully compatible with sentimentalism; on the other hand, he also emphasizes a "Kantian interpretation" of the original position which suggests that the conclusions drawn from this thought experiment are justified in a rationalist manner.
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The idea of reflective equilibrium is introduced, not in the normative justification of justice as fairness per se, but rather in its descriptive formulation. Here, Rawls suggests that "one may think of moral theory at first… as the attempt to describe our moral capacity; or, in the Such a theory of reflective equilibrium is wholly compatible with the sentimentalist tradition's understanding of moral and political reflection. Indeed, Rawls describes his theory in its initial stages as "a theory of the moral sentiments (to recall an eighteenth century title) setting out the principles governing our moral powers, or, more specifically, our sense of justice" (TJ, p.
44). If anything, the notion of reflective equilibrium in the sentimentalist tradition is even more robust than Rawls's own. Although Rawls sometimes seems to see the quest for reflective equilibrium as basically cognitive process involving the weighing of pre-philosophical beliefs against philosophical theories, the sentimentalist conception of reflection involves a holistic attempt to reach an equilibrium on which the faculties of reason, feeling and imagination can all settle in harmony. 37 Yet if Rawls's arguments successfully establish that his is the best available theory of justice under cognitive reflective equilibrium, then it seems likely that his theory will capture our settled commitments under a broader, sentimentalist reflective equilibrium as well.
Rawls's own implicitly sentimentalist descriptive moral psychology certainly indicates as such.
Yet Rawls also devotes a section of his book to "the Kantian interpretation" of justice as fairness (TJ, pp. 221-227), and then alludes to this interpretation throughout the rest of the work.
Here, the combination of mutual disinterest and the veil of ignorance in Rawls's thought Yet any picture of Rawls as a Kantian on the subject is complicated by the fact that Rawls elsewhere presents "the connection between acting justly and natural attitudes" as one of three possible arguments for why the sense of justice is good for those who possess it. This (implicitly) sentimentalist line of reasoning is followed both by the (explicitly) "Aristotelian"
argument that "participating in the life of a well-ordered society is a great good" and the (also explicitly) "Kantian" argument that "acting justly is something we want to do as free and equal rational beings" (TJ, pp. 499-501). Although Rawls repeatedly emphasizes the debt his theory of justice owes to Kant, it is clear that "the Kantian interpretation" is merely one interpretation of the sources of its normative authority, and that other interpretations are possible, including sentimentalist interpretations.
The Two Enlightenments in Overlapping Consensus
In his later writings, rather than settling decisively on any of the interpretations of normative justification outlined in A Theory of Justice, Rawls simply decided to bracket the question of full philosophical and normative justification as such. The "political liberalism" of these later works "applies the principle of toleration to philosophy itself," 38 thus opening the way for adherents of a variety of worldviews to participate in an overlapping consensus supporting justice as fairness. Rawls here argues that his theory of justice should be acceptable to many of those in a democratic society otherwise divided in their beliefs. The doctrines held by those participating in this overlapping consensus will likely be "comprehensive," meaning that they include "conceptions of what is of value in human life, ideals of personal virtue and the like,"
and hence, when we affirm them, "inform much of our conduct (in the limit of our life as a whole)." 39 Those participating in an overlapping consensus share political conceptions such as justice, but insofar as they affirm different fully and partially comprehensive doctrines, they will take opposing stands on other moral and philosophical matters. It is easy to be led astray by Rawls's description of the balance of values in this moral module as "reasonable." An appeal to the reasonable certainly sounds like an appeal to a Kantian notion of morally authoritative reason. Rawls, however, sees the reasonable, not as a criterion of rationality which transcends opposing moral commitments, but as itself a moral commitment, and his theory explicitly "does not try to derive the reasonable from the rational" (PL, p. 52). The use of the term "reasonable" to designate acknowledgement of certain moral principles may seem unusual, but Rawls insists that "common sense views the reasonable but not, in general, the rational as a moral idea involving moral sensibility." 41 Rawls's political liberalism does not insist that "the reasonable is the whole of moral sensibility." It does assert, however, that the reasonable "includes the part [of morality] that connects with the idea of fair social cooperation" (PL, p. 51). 42 Each reasonable comprehensive doctrine in an overlapping consensus provides its own full normative justification for the authority of this part of morality.
In this way, it becomes "central to political liberalism that free and equal citizens affirm both a comprehensive doctrine and a political conception [of justice]" (PL, pp. 608-609). Once philosophy reaches its political limits, a theory of justice must still be vindicated by a comprehensive doctrine. Rawls maintains that political philosophers must reconcile themselves to the inevitable pluralism of the modern nation-state, and hence help to build a regime of social cooperation including those with many diverse worldviews. Therefore, by necessity, modern political philosophy "proceeds from some consensus: from premises that we and others recognize as true, or as reasonable for the purpose of reaching a working agreement on the fundamentals of political justice." 43 Rawls makes a convincing case, Jean Hampton argues, that "whatever else political philosophy ought to involve," it should sometimes focus on how best to create a truly political liberalism, one which can serve as a shared commitment for those otherwise divided by moral, religious and philosophical differences. 44 Rawls's political liberalism is the sort of theory that we must turn to when, as Rawls himself puts it, "our shared political understandings… break down."
Rawls realizes, however, that we must also turn to political philosophy "when we are torn within ourselves" (PL, p. 44). If we cannot reflectively commit ourselves to a conception of justice which we can share with our fellow citizens, Rawls writes, we may "grow distant from our political society and retreat into our social world"; we may "feel left out… withdrawn and cynical." 45 It is for this reason that Thomas Nagel writes that the "ultimate aim of political theory" is to "justify a political system to everyone who is required to live in it." 46 Those with a well-defined, fully comprehensive worldview can often, at least hypothetically, be given such a justification through a skilled appeal to certain authoritative texts or traditions. Yet those seeking a full philosophical justification for liberalism must begin the work of justification from scratch. What is more, the sentimentalist approach to political theory seems particularly suited to the modern, diverse societies which Rawls discusses. Although citizens in such societies may have many opposing moral convictions, they must come to some agreement on basic principles of justice. While some might hope to build a consensus behind these principles on the basis of reason alone, this is not the only faculty that all of us share. Given that our task is to build a just society for human beings, and not for rational beings as such, there is no reason why we cannot also appeal to the many non-rational features of the human psyche which we possess in common-our emotion, our imagination, and our ability to share in the inner life of others via sympathy. To forego these rich resources in either political theory or political practice would be a terrible waste. Although Rawls himself exaggerates the extent of his debts to Kant and minimizes the extent of his debts to Hume and Smith, much of the richness of his own political theory stems from the fact that it implicitly incorporates the insights of the sentimentalist as well as the rationalist Enlightenment. 5 Although both Enlightenments share a commitment to this ideal, the term "reflective autonomy" is my own, and was not used in the eighteenth century. My name for this shared ideal intentionally combines terms from the two Enlightenments. It was the sentimentalists who spoke most often of "reflection" and of humans as "reflective" beings; rationalists of course preferred to speak of humans as "rational" beings. And it was the rationalists who most often spoke of "autonomy." Yet the sentimentalists clearly saw the reflection they describe as autonomous, while the rationalists clearly saw the autonomy they describe as reflective, even as each avoided the other's terminology. 29 See the discussion of Rawls's "morality of principles" as maintaining the affective concern for others first developed through the "morality of association" in Callan, op. cit., pp. 93-94.
Although Callan rejects what he calls "sentimentality" (pp. There is no reason, however, to think that believing our moral psychology has its origins in natural selection will prevent our reflective endorsement of the commitments to which this psychology leads us-unlike, say, believing that this psychology represents an internalization of the interests of a ruling class of capitalists or clergy. For purposes of her example, Korsgaard merely stipulates that the Darwinian theory does so, without claiming that this is actually the case. Indeed, she doubts that it is true even of Nietzschean and Freudian theories, which, rather than preventing the reflective endorsement of any moral commitments, merely believe "that our moral nature needs to be reformed and modified in certain ways in order to prevent it from making us ill" (p. 78, fn. 
